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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ~HF. STATF.: OF UTAH 
STATE OF U'!'AH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
SANnRA J. TALBOT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 1834<' 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with manslaughter, a second-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-5-205 
(1953), as amenaea, for the homicine of Brandon ~len Talbot on 
lluly 11, 19Al. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted Novernber 19, 19Rl of 
manslaughter in a jury trial before the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorensen, Judge, presiding in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah. On February 26, 
1982, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in prison. 
R.EL I EF SOUGHT ON APP F.AL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's 
conviction and sentence. 
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STATF.:MENT OF THR FACTS 
Appellant was tried on November lA-19, 1981 for the 
homicide of Brandon Glen Talbot, appellant's IR-month-old son. 
When Brandon was four months old, he was 
hospitalized at Utah valley Hospital on March 15, 1~80 and was 
treated by Dr. Brent Griffin, a pediatrician, for "failure to 
-
thrive," a term which refers to_._.an inadequate weight gain or 
below normal growth in a young child (State's Exhibit 9: T. 
27). Dr. r,riffin suspected that appellant was not providing 
adequate care for Brandon and he requested the assistance of· 
the Utah nivision of Family Services, which investigated the 
case (State's Exhibit q: T. 36). Brandon gained weight during 
his three-week hospital stay and was then released to 
appellant's custody (State's Exhibit ~). The Division of 
Family Services, with the assistance of police officers, 
removed Brandon from appellant's custody because of neglect 
and placed him in a foster home (State's Exhibit 9: T. lOn). 
Rrandon remained in the foster home from April lR, 1980 until 
April 30, 1981,· when he was returned to appellant's cus~ody 
(T. 97, 100: State's Exhibit 9). 
On July 11, 1981, appellant was at her Provo, Utah 
home when Brandon awoke at 10:30 a.m. (T. 92: State's Exhibit 
9). Appellant had prohlems with Brandon because he was 
playing in the toilet ana throwing temper tantrums, so she 
placed Brandon back in bed (T. 92: State's Exhibit 9). 
-?.-
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Appellant's husband, Rodney Talbot, left the apartment for his 
job around 10 a.m., leaving appellant with sole custody of 
Brandon ( T. 112 ; State ' s Ex h ib i t 9 ) • 
When Brandon woke up about 1 p.m., appellant placed 
him in a kitchen chair and gave him a piece of toast ( T. _en, 
112; State's Exhibit 9). Because Rrandon was having another 
temper tantrum, appellant slapped him (T. <n, 112; State's 
Exhibit 9). Brandon's "head hi-t pretty hard on the table" ( T. 
93, 112; State's Exhibit 9). Appellant was alarmed at how 
hard she slapped him, she hugged him and said she would not do 
it again (T. 9~, 112; State's Exhibit 9). While appellant was 
adjusting the television, she heard ~ranaon choking and saw 
him fall out of the chair (T. 93, 112; State's Exhibit 9). 
Appellant pie ked Brandon up and ran to a neighbor's home to 
get transportation to Utah Valley Hospital, where they arrived 
at about 1:30 p.m. (T. lOR, 113; State's Exhibit 9). 
On arrival at the hospital, Brandon had breathing 
difficulties and had a rapid heart rate (T. 17, 27). Dr. 
Robert Gray, an emergency room physician, suctioned multiple 
pieces of food and vomit from Brandon's throat and placed an 
endotrachial tube into the trachea to artificially resuscitate 
the child (T. 17, 28). Phenobarbital was administered to help 
control the seizures Brandon was having (T. 2R). nr. r,ray 
became concerned about the head injuries because Rrandon did 
not begin normal breathing after his throat was cleared (T. 
18). The normal level of acid in Brandon's blood indicated 
-3-
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that suffocation on food was not the cause of Brandon's 
breathing problems (T. 18). Dr. Gray had not ruled out child 
abuse as the cause of the breathing problems (T. 21). The 
history from appellant that the child was sitting in a chair, 
was eating, fell from the chair, vomited and quit breathing 
was inconsistent with the physical examination of Brandon, who 
had new, acute head bruises and several older bruises (T. 24). 
Dr. Gray could not say whether it was likely that the head 
injuries could be caused by a fall from a chair (T. 25). 
Recause Brandon had multiple head bruises, which could cause 
vomiting, Dr. Gray requested the assistance of nr. Brent 
Griffin, a pediatrician, and Dr. John Andrews, a neurologist 
(T. 19-20). 
nr. Brent Griffin had treated Brandon on March 5, 
1980 for "failure to thrive"1 the child was not gaining weight 
or growing normally (T. 271 State's Exhibit 9). Dr. Griffin 
was surprised by the blood gas tests because the acid content 
was at a normal level, indicating that choking on food was not 
the cause of Brandon's breathing problems (T. 34-3S). nr. 
Griffin saw several bruises on Brandon's forehead and back, 
which were of different colors, indicating that they were of 
various ages (T. 35). He was also concerned with child abuse 
because it is uncommon for a child to have multiple bruises, 
especially an !A-month-old child with multiple bruises on the 
back (T. 36-37). It is very unlikely that a child could 
sustain a severe brain injury from a fall off a chair (T. 38). 
-4-
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Griffin could not explain the severe brain injury from the 
history that appellant had given and he would be surprised if 
the injury had been caused by a fall from a chair to a tile 
floor CT. 39-40). 
Brandon had highly elevated pressure inside his head 
the night after his hospital admission and on July 13, 1981 at 
ahout_ i a.m., Dr. r,riffin pronounced Brandon dead (~. 39-4n). 
Dr. Griffin believed he died from severe intercranial swelling 
and pressure on the brain from an injury caused by a blow or 
blows to Brandon's head (T. 40). Dr. r,riffin considered a 
number of possible causes of the brain injury, including 
accident, but a blow or something striking his head caused 
Brandon's death (T. 43-44). 
Dr. John Andrews made a neurological examination of 
Brandon from 4:3n to 5:30 p.m. CT. 4R). Brandon was in a 
semicomatose state, not fully alert with abnormal posturing 
and with involuntary movements (T. 48). Also present were 
abnormal eye movements and decorticate and decerebrate 
(different degrees) levels of severe and considerable brain 
damage, "even down into the region of the vital centers of the 
brain in the hrain stem region, down low in the medulla pons 
and midbrain area" (T. 48-49). 
Dr. Andrews believed the injuries were caused by a 
blow to the head because of intercranial pressure, swelling 
where the optic nerve joins the back of the eye, hemorrhages 
in the eyes, and bruises of various colors (T. 50). Dr. 
-5-
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Andrews rejected choking or suffocation on food as an 
explanation for the severe injuries because the acid content 
in Brandon's blood was normal and because the severity of the 
brain injury was inconsistent with suffocation (T. 52). The 
history given by appellant did not explain the severity of the 
brain damage and the subsequent course of Brandon's health (T. 
53). -He staten that a fall from a chair may account for one 
of the bruises, but not for multiple bruises and that a fall 
from a chair would be unlikely to cause Brandon's injury (T. 
57). 
Dr. Andrews did not rule out "battered child 
syndrome 11 l (T. 5!l-fi0) because of the bruises on the head, 
especially the left temple bruise (T. ~6), bruises on the 
child's back (T. 56), "a scab or a bruise or cut, abrasion" on 
the child's penis (T. S6), several scattered bruises and 
diaper rash on the buttocks (T. 5fi-57), and because of the 
discrepancies between the medical examination of Brandon and 
the history given by aopellant (T. 59-60). He could not rule 
out with medical certainty that accident was the cause of the 
brain injury (T. 62-63). 
l"Rattered Child Syndrome" is a term by which 
children are injured other than by accident. State v. Loss, 
204 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1Q73)1 United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 
527 (5th Cir. 1981). As explained in State v. Per1man, 230 
S.E.2d 802 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), it indicates that "the group 
of signs or symptoms they observed precludes the notion that 
the injuries were self-inflicted or inflicted by other than 
the intentional violence of another." 
-fi-
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Dr. John Wallace Graham, a medical examiner for the 
State of Utah, performed an autopsy on Brandon on July 13, 
1981 (T. 72). Dr. nraham's external and internal examination 
of Brandon revealed that the primary cause of death was a very 
large bruise over the left top of the head which caused a 
bilateral subdural hematorna and severe brain swelling (T. 
74-75, 78). The child's injuries were not consistent with 
Brandon's falling from one of the chairs because the fatal 
internal injury was too severe (T. 76). Brandon would have 
had to fall from a considerably greater height than a chair to 
sustain a severe head injury (T. 76). 
His conclusion was that a solid object struck 
Brandon's head or that the head had been banged against a 
solid object (T. 76). nr. Graham ruled out accident entirely 
as a cause of Brandon's injuries (T. Rl). He agreed that an 
accident may have caused soMe of the bruises, but there were 
too many injuries of differinq ages to consider an accident as 
the cause of the fatal injury, which was extremely severe (T. 
80-81). He stated that Brandon's injuries were consistent 
with "Battered Child Syndrome" because there were bruises on 
various parts of Brandon's boay, there were injuries of 
various ages, and the injuries were not explained adequately 
and consistently with those caused by accidents (T. 83). 
on July 14, 1981, neorge Pierpont, a Provo City 
police officer, met appellant and her husband at their 
apartment (T. ~5-66, R4: State's F.xhibit q). He transported 
-7-
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them to the Provo Police Department where he conducted an 
investigation of the case (T. 66, 847 State's Exhibit 9). 
Prior to questioning, Pierpont advised appellant of her 
Miranda rights, which she said she understood (T. 84-8,7 
State's Exhibit 18). Appellant signed a form waiving her 
Miranda rights (State's Exhibit 18). 
In the conversation with Pierpont, appellant 
explained that she and her husband had been having marriage 
problems because appellant' husband was not Brandon's 
biological father, which was not discovered by her husband 
until after their marriage (T. 92, 1117 State's Exhibit 9). 
Appellant also said that her family had been having financial 
problems, that she had few friends in the area, and that she 
was constantly with her chilnren (T. 92, 114-1157 State's 
Exhibit 9). During the last three weeks, appellant was 
hitting Brandon and often hit him "harder than I really 
expected to" (T. 93, 1177 State's Exhibit 9). After noticing 
bruises on Brandon's back, Rodney Talbot told appellant not to 
discipline the child (T. 115-1167 State's Exhibit 9)_. 
While the officer taped the conversation, appellant 
had the opportunity to agree that the officer was correctly 
interpreting her comments (T. 94). After the conversation was 
typed, appellant reviewed the statement to make any deletions 
or corrections (T. 94). Each page of the statement given to 
Officer Pierpont was signen and dated by appellant (T. 94: 
State's Bxhibit Q). The statement was admitted into evinence 
(T. 95~. 
-R-
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At trial, appellant said her husband beat Brandon 
(T. 112). On July 11, 1981, Brandon did not want to eat a 
piece of toast "and I slapped him. And after I slapped him 
his head his pretty hard on the table" (T. 112). Under cross-
examination, appellant said her husband warned her about 
hitting Brandon (T. 115-116), that she was alarmed with the 
force she had used (T. llB), that the left temple bruise was 
caused after she slapped Brandon, he lost his balance and hit 
his head on the side of the tab le ( T. l lt:l). She slapped him 
because she lost her temper (~. 120). 
In a jury trial on November 18-19, 1981, appellant 
was found guilty of manslaughter. After a QQ-day evaluation 
by the Utah Division of Corrections, .Judge Allen B. Sorensen 
sentenced appellant on February 2~, lOR2 to one year nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 4'5, 53-54, 
f) 7) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS 
DELICTI OF' MANSLAUGHTER, WHICH REQUIRES 
( l) EV! DENCE OF A DF.ATH OF A HUMAN BEIN";, 
AND (2) EVIDRNCE THAT THE DEATH RESULTED 
FROM CRIMINAL CONDUCT. 
The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, a 
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., 
~ 76-5-205(l)(a) (1Q53), as amenden, in that appellant, on or 
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about July 11, 1981 nid recklessly cause the death of Brandon 
Glen Talbot. Utah Code Ann.,~~ 76-5-201 and 76-5-205(l)(a) 
when read together define one theory of manslaughter as where 
an actor unlawfully and recklessly causes the death of 
another. Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-7.-103(3) (1953), as amended, 
defines recklessly as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
( 3) Recklessly ••• with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unj ustif iab le risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Under this theory of manslaughter, the State was 
required to prove: (1) that appellant acted unlawfully, (2) 
that appellant acted recklessly, i.e., was aware of but 
consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that her conduct would result in the death of Brandon Talbot, 
anti ( 3) that appellant caused the death of Brandon Talbot. 
The jury found that the State's evidence was sufficient to 
establish these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant contenas that the trial court erred in 
allowing the police officer to testify about statements 
appellant made several days after Brandon was initially 
-10-
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treated in the emergency room at Utah valley Hospital. 
Appellant alleges that the error occurred when the trial court 
admitted these statements before the corpus delicti of 
manslaughter had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant's argument also assumes that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the conviction. These claims are refuted 
by the evidence admitteo at trial. 
Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the 
offense, the existence of a criminal fact without the 
existence of which there is nothing to investigate. State v. 
Johnson, 95 Utah ~72, R3 P.2d 1010 (1938). The requirement of 
corpus delicti has two elements: (1) that the State present 
evidence that the injury specified in the crime occurred, and 
(2) that the State present evidence that such injury was 
caused by someone's criminal conduct. State v. Knoefler, 
Utah, Sfi) P.2d 175 (197'): State v. Kimbel, Tltah, 620 P.2d 1515 
(1980): State v. cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554 (1974). Thus, the 
term corpus delicti in a homicide case involves the fact of 
the death ana the fact that death was brought a.l:>out or induced 
by a criminal agency. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 
1010 (193R). 
In the homicide context, the "injury" in the first 
part of the corpus delicti definition is the death of a human 
being. State v. Petree, Utah, P.2d (Case No. 18015, 
filed Fehruary 4, 1983): State v. Pyle, 53~ P.2d 1309 (Kan. 
-11-
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. -1975): State v. Smith, 531 P.2d 843 (Wash. Ct. ~pp. 1975): 
People v. Brechon, 390 ~.E.~d 626 (Ill. 1979). 
For the second requirement, the State need only 
present evidence that the death resulted from criminal 
conduct, rather than by accident or from natural ca uses. 
State v. Petree, supra: Riley v. State, 349 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. 
1976): Tanner v. State, 327 So.2d 749 (Ala. Crim App. 1976). 
It is not necessary to show cause of death or to provide 
evidence on the specific degree of homicine. State v. Petree, 
supra. Additionally, contrary to appellant's claims, the 
second element does not require that the crime perpetrator's 
identity be proven. State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554 
(1974): State v. Johnson, 95 Utah ~72, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938): 
Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83 (Del. 19~9). This Court in 
State v. Knoefler, supra, explained the State's burden of 
proof in establishing the corpus delicti: 
••• the requirement of independent proof 
of the corpus delicti requires only that 
the State present evidence that the injury 
specified in the crime occurred, and that 
such injury was caused by someone's 
criminal conduct. An admission or 
confession is admissible to connect an 
accused with the crime committed, but the 
connection of the accused with the crime 
need not be proven to establish the corpus 
delicti. 
563 P.2d at 176 (emphasis .addea). 
Other authorities also support the view that the 
corpus delicti does not require that the State prove appellant 
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was the guilty party. Professor McCormick explainen the rule 
as follows: 
To establish guilt, it is generally 
necessary for the prosecution to show that 
(a) the injury of harm specified in the 
crime occurred, (b) this injury or harm 
was caused by someone's criminal activity, 
and (c) the defendant was the guilty 
party. To sustain a conviction, the 
requirement of indepennent proof of the 
corpus delicti demands only that the 
prosecution have introduced independent 
evidence tending to show (a) and (b). It 
is not necessary that the independent 
proof tend to connect the oefendant with 
the crime. 
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of F.vidence, E. Cleary, ~ 15A 
a t p • 3 4; ( 2nd F.d • 19 7 2 ) • 
Not all of the elements of the crime neea to be 
proven because "otherwise, corpus oelicti would be synonymous 
with whole of charge." Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, at ~6 
(Del. 1979). Corpus delicti does not include all the elements 
of the crime1 independent proof of the corpus delicti is a 
separate question from that of whether appellant committed the 
crime. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 2sc; (1941)1 
State v. Cazier, Utah, ~21 P.2d 554 ( 1974). In State v. 
Chesnut, Utah, 621 P.2d 1228 (1~80), this Court stated: 
This Court rejected the contention 
that the corpus delicti of a crime 
inclunes the total proof of all elements 
necessary to convict oefendant of the 
crime charged in State v. Cazier. This 
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Court explained the traditional and 
practically universal concept of the term 
"corpus delicti," which means literally 
the body of the crime, in regard to proof 
of crime, refers only to evidence that the 
crime has been committea. 
This Court has continually held that the corpus delicti of a 
crime does not include proving the appellant's connection with 
the crime. 
Appellant states that the corpus delicti must be 
established "beyond a reasonable doubt." She does not cite 
any supporting case law. In fact, the standard for proving 
the eleMents of the corpus delicti is the lesser standard of 
"proof of clear and convincing evidence." This standard of 
proof was established by State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 
P.2d 173 (1954) which stated: 
An accused cannot be convicted on his 
confession alone. We believe and hold 
that in addition there must be 
independent, clear and convincing evidence 
of the corpus delicti, although we and the 
authorities generally do not require it to 
be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This Court has expressly rejected the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard for proving corpus delicti. It is generally 
agreed that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not be 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," "conclusive" or "sufficient to 
warrant a conviction." State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 
p. 2d 3 5 3 ( 19 5 7) • 
-14-
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Furthermore, there is no requirement that the corpus 
delicti he proved by eyewitnesses. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 
572, R3 P.2d 1010 (193R). The two elements of corpus delicti 
can he proven by circumstantial evidence. State v. Petree, 
Utah,--~ P.2d --~(Case No. 18015, filed February 4, 1983); 
State v. Long, 369 P.2d 247 (Kan. 1962). The elements can 
also be proved by the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
-· 
the direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Petree, 
supra; People v. Ramierez, q1 Cal. App. 3d 132, 153 Cal. Rptr. 
789 (Cal. Ct. App. 197Q); People v. Wetzel, 17 Cal. Rptr. 879 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1Q62). In the present case, it is not 
fatal to the State's case that there were no eyewitnesses to 
the homicide of Brannon. The trial judge could review all the 
evidence, including the testimony of four physicians, and draw 
reasonable inferences to support the conclusion that the 
corpus delicti of manslaughter had been established. 
These rules of corpus delicti reflect two competing 
interests: (1) to prevent convictions based solely on the 
defendant• s statements, and ( /.) the recognition of the 
probativeness and evidentiary value of a defendant's 
statements after a crime has been committed. 
The purpose of the rule was to safeguard 
against convicting the innocent on the 
strength of false confessions. • • • As a 
precaution against convicting the innocent 
in the few instances when persons mentally 
disturbed or impelled by strange 
motivations might confess to crimes they 
did not commit. 
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State v. Weldon, 6 Utah ?.d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (1957). At the 
same time, because false confessions occur in extremely rare 
situations, courts recognize the evidentiary value and 
validity of statements, admissions or confessions made by 
criminal defendants because of the "natural compunction people 
have against confessing to or implicating themselves in 
crimes." State v. Weldon, supra. 
The rule (that appellant's statement, by itself, 
cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti of the crime 
and justify a conviction) should be applied with caution and 
not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction to the 
administration of justice. State v. Weldon, supra. The rule 
best suited to the proper administration of justice is that 
reasonable minds could believe that the manslaughter of 
Brandon Talbot is a real crime which was in fact committed, 
and not a crime which was fanciful or imaginary. Id. 
A. THE CORPUS DELICTI OF MANSLAUr,HTER WAS 
SUFFICIP,NTLY ESTARLISHJID BY THE 
PROSECUTION BEFORE THE APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENTS WERE ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCP.. 
Appellant argues that the prosecution introduced 
appellant's statements before the corpus delicti of the crime 
was established. This is contrary to what happened at trial. 
The first element of corpus delicti in a homicide case (the 
death of Brandon Talbot) was established by the evidence at 
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the trial. Dr. Br.ent Gr if fin pronounced Brandon dead on July 
13, 1981 at .., a.m. (T. 40). nr. Robert Nelson Gray was told 
the child died (T. 21). Dr. John Andrews said severe brain 
damage caused Brandon's death (T. 62). Police Officer George 
Pierpont investigated Brandon's death (T. 65, 84). nr ... Tohn 
Wallace ~raham performed an autopsy on the body of Brandon 
Talbot (T. 72). All of this evidence was presented at trial 
before George Pierpont testifien to the statements made by 
appellant (which is at T. <H-93). 
There was also clear and convincing evidence of the 
second element of corpus delicti, that the death resulted from 
criminal conduct, rather than by accident or from natural 
causes. nr. Robert nray, the emergency roorn physician at Utah 
valley Hospital, initially suspected that Brandon had choked 
on food, but he rejected an accident as the cause of Brandon's 
breathing problems because Brandon did not resume normal 
breathing when the pieces of food were suctioned from his 
throat (T. 19) because there were multiple head injuries (T. 
19), because the acid content in Brandon's blood had remained 
normal (~. lR), because nr. Gray suspected child abuse (T. 
21), and because the doctor's physical examination of Brandon 
revealed problems which were not consistent with the 
background information provided by appellant (T. 24). 
nr. Brent r,riffin also suspected criminal conduct 
rather than an accident as the cause of Brandon's death 
because the blood gas tests showed that accidental choking was 
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not the cause of Brandon's breathing difficulty (T. 34-35). 
It is not common to see children with multiple bruises (T. 
36-37) and Brannon was suspected to be a victim of child abuse 
(T. 36). He said it would be very unlikely that a child could 
receive a severe brain injury from a fall although a bruise is 
possible (T. 3R). He could not explain Brandon's severe brain 
injury consistently with the history that had been obtained 
from appellant (T. 39) and he would be surprised if the severe 
injury was causea by a fall from a chair to a tile floor (T. 
40). His opinion was that Brannon's death was caused by a 
blow or blows to the head (T. 40, 44). 
Dr. John Andrews• testimony also rejected the 
initial explanation of accidental choking. He suspected 
criminal conduct because of the multiple bruises (T. 49), and 
because a severe blow to the head would more likely cause the 
swelling where the optic nerve enters the back of the eye and 
would more likely cause the hemorrhages in Brandon's eyes (T. 
49-~0). He said the brain injury was incompatible with 
accidental suffocation (T. 52) and the history given by 
appellant was inconsistent with the severity of the brain 
damage (T. 53). Because of the discrepancies between 
Brandon's injuries and appellant's explanation of the 
injuries, nr. Andrews wa~ concerned about "child abuse 
syndrome" (~. 59). 
Additional evidence of the second element of corpus 
delicti was provided by nr. John Wallace Graham, who performen 
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the autopsy. Re suspected criminal conduct because there were 
six bruises on Brandon's head (T. ~s). The severity of 
Brandon's injuries was not consistent with Brandon's falling 
from a chair onto a floor {T. 76), and there were too many 
injuries to Brandon's head to believe that they were caused 
accidentally {T. AO). Brandon's injuries were consistent with 
"Battered Child Syndrome" because different body segments had 
bruises, the injuries were of different ages, and the injuries 
were not explained adequately through accidental cause {T. 
83). Graham concluded that death was caused by a solid object 
striking Brandon's head or Brandon's head being banged against 
a solid object (T. 76). 
Again, all of this testimony on the second element 
of corpus delicti was received before Officer Pierpont 
testified about the· statements which appellant made to him 
during the investigation. This testimony, and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, provides clear and 
convincing evidence of the two elements of corpus delicti. 
B. EVIDENCE THAT ACCIDENT COULD NOT BE 
RUL~D OUT AS THE CAUSE OF THE IRTURIF.S 
DOES NOT DESTROY THE CORPUS nELICTI IN 
THIS CASE, WHERE Af'l ACCIDENT WAS 
EXTREMELY UNLIKP.LY TO CAUSE THE 
INJURIES. 
Appellant claims throughout her brief that the 
evidence showed that Brandon's injuries could have been caused 
accidentally, and thus, there was no evidence of any criminal 
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agency. Appellant misinterprets what the physicians actually 
said at trial. Admittedly, some of the testimony was that 
accident could not be rulen out with medical certainty as the 
cause of Brandon's injuries. However, this does not destroy 
what all of the doctors basically agreed to: it would be 
extremely unlikely that the injuries could have been caused by 
an accinent. 
Because of appellant's contentions that an accident 
was not conclusively ruled out by the physicians as the cause 
of Brandon's injuries and, therefore, no criminal conduct was 
proven, a thorough review of the evidence on the accident 
theory contention is necessary. 
Dr. Robe rt r:;ra y had not ruled out child ab use as a 
cause of Brandon's injuries (T. ?.l). Rrandon did not resume 
normal breathing when the fooa and vomit were suctioned from 
his throat and Dr. Gray rejected an accident as the cause of 
Brandon's problems (T. 19). The doctor's physical examination 
of Brandon revealed inconsistencies with the background 
information providen by appellant (T. 24). He could not 
determine what caused the death because he had treated Brandon 
only in the short time of the emergency situation (T. 22). 
nr. nray said one of the bruises would be consistent with a 
fall from a chair, but a fall would not explain all of the 
bruises (T. 24). nr. Gray testified that he could not answer 
the question whether the injuries coulci have been caused by a 
fall from a chair (~. 2~). 
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Dr. Brent Griffin, who first treated Brandon in 1980 
for "failure to thrive" shortly before Brandon was taken from 
the custody of appellant and placed in a foster home, stated 
that the bruises on Brandon's head could have been caused by 
any type of blow or fall, and that his concern was that 
Brandon was a victim of child abuse (T. 3~). His belief was 
based in part on the multiple bruises Brandon had, which were 
not normal for an 18-month-old child (T. 37). Griffin drew a 
distinction between the bruise on the exterior of Brandon's 
head ana the severe internal brain injury. He said it was 
possible that the degree of bruising which appeared on the 
outside of Brandon's head was consistent with a fall from a 
chair to the floor (T. 38). However, Dr. Griffin qualifien 
this general point with reference to the more severe internal 
injury: it would be very unlikely that a child could sustain 
a severe brain injury from a fall from a chair to the floor 
( T. 38) • 
Because of the neurological signs, increased 
intercranial pressure, and unresponsiveness to trea_tment, Dr. 
r,riffin said that Brandon sustained extremely severe injuries, 
much more severe than the accidental falls onto the floor 
which young children typically encounter (T. 3q). The severe 
brain injury was inconsistent with the history provided by 
appellant that the injuries were accidentally received from a 
fal 1 to the floor and he would be "very surprised" if the 
injuries had happened by falling from a chair onto a tile 
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floor (T. 39-40). His conclusion was that death resulted from 
a blow or blows delivered to Brandon's head. He did say that 
he could not with medical certainty rule out accident as the 
cause of the injury (T. 43), but his opinion still remained 
that the death was caused by something striking Brandon's head 
(T. 44). 
Dr. John Andrews said Brandon had suffered extreme 
brain damage, "even down into the region of the vital centers 
of the brain in the brain stem region" (T. 48). There were 
scattered body and head bruises, and abnormal eye movements, 
which indicated that the bruise on Brandon's head was not only 
a superficial injury but a deep brain injury (T. 49). The 
injury to Brandon's left temple region was only a few hours 
old when he made his examination at 4:30 p.m. on July 11 (T. 
61). 
He suspected a blow to Brandon's head caused the 
bra in injury be ca use eye examinations revealed intercranial 
pressure and hemorrhages inside the eyes because of multiple 
body bruises ana because of the severe brain injury (T. 
50-51). The history given by appellant did not explain the 
severity of the brain damage and the history was also 
inconsistent with the death of Brandon (T. 53). nr. Andrews 
said it was unlikely that a fall from a chair to the floor 
would cause the severe injuries (T. s~). He could not say 
that it was impossible for a fall to the floor to cause the 
injuries, but a fall would not account for all of Brandon's 
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bruises (T. 57). Re could not with rnenical certainty rule out 
accident as the cause of injury (T. ~2). However, Dr. 
Andrews' main concern was that Brandon may have been abused 
because of the discrepancies between the history given by 
appellant and the neurological examination, which indicated 
purposeful abuse rather than accident (T. 59-60). 
Dr. John Wallace Graham, a state medical examiner, 
said the cause of death was a head injury which resulted in 
external bruising, a bilateral subdural hematoma and severe 
brain swelling (T. 75). The most serious and fatal injury was 
the one on the left side of Brandon's head, which was mainly 
an internal injury (T. 75). The other bruises may have 
contributed to the internal damage (T. 76). He said the 
injuries to Brandon's head were too severe to be consistent 
with a fall from one of the chairs (T. 77). His conclusion 
was that a solid object struck Brandon's head or his head was 
banged against a solid object (T. 76, 80). 
Appellant claims, but does not cite to the 
transcript to support her claims, that nr. Graham sa·ia the 
injuries could have been caused by an accidental fall. 
However, Dr. Graham conclusively ruled out accident as the 
cause of death (T. an). Based on his experience with 
homicides of children, he said there were several reasons for 
his conclusion, including: (1) the severity of the injury (T. 
80)7 (2) the many bruises (T. 80)7 (3) bruises of different 
ages (T. 81) 7 and (4) the injuries were consistent with 
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"Battereo Child Syndrome" because there were injuries 
involving different body segments, injuries were of different 
ages, and the injuries were not adequately explained through 
accidental causes (T. 82-83). 
A review of the evidence refutes appellant's claims 
that the State only proved: 
that the life of Brannon Talbot had ended 
aue to injuries received to the head which 
injuries could have been the result of the 
child falling accidentally against a hard 
object or a hard object accidentally 
hitting the child's head. 
(appellant's brief, 7). It bears repeating that the only 
physician, Dr. r,raham, who had the opportunity to view both 
the external head injuries and the severe internal brain 
injury (therefore in the best position to analyze the 
injuries' cause) conclusively stated that an accident could 
not have caused Brandon's head injuries or the resulting 
death. 
The three other physicians (Gray, Griffin and 
Andrews) also provided probative evidence on appellant's 
contention that Rrandon•s injuries were sustained 
accidentally. Each of their medical examinations of Rrando 
was li~itea, in general, to a review of only the external 
injuries, which din not clearly show the severity of the brain 
injuries. Yet, each of the three doctors agreed that an 
accident was unlikely. The three doctors thus discounted 
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accident while the state medical examiner conclusively ruled 
out an accident as the cause of Brandon's injuries. 
The doctors' statements that they could not with 
medical certainty rule out accident as the cause of Brandon's 
death does not destroy the elements of corpus delicti, proven 
by clear and convincing evidence by the State before 
appellant's statements were admitted into evidence. Not being 
able to rule out accident with medical certainty goes to the 
credibility of the doctors as witnesses and what weight should 
be given to their testimony by the jury. It does not make the 
evidence insufficient to prove corpus delicti in this case 
where accident was very unlikely but could not with medical 
certainty be rule0 out by some doctors as the cause of 
Brandon's injuries. Even without the statements by appellant 
to Officer Pierpont, the corpus delicti of manslaughter was 
shown by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant's claims, 
unsupported by the evidence, that the injuries were caused 
accidentally does not destroy the corpus delicti. 
Appellant attempts to confuse the proof required to 
sustain a conviction with proof re~uired for corpus delicti 
before appellant's statements may be admitted into evidence. 
Appellant cites Bennett v. State, 377 1?.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963), 
State v. Thatcher, lOR Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 ( l<l45), and State 
v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 27~, 495 P.2d 318 (1972) for the 
proposition that: 
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the State must prove the fact of the 
child's death and secondly the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable noubt that the 
child's death was caused by means of 
criminal agency inflicted by the accused. 
As discussed supra, the standard for proving corpus delicti in 
Utah is proof by clear and convincing evidence. Also as 
discussed supra, the State does not need to show that the 
appellant is connected with the criminal conduct as part of 
the corpus nelicti. In addition, appellant's cited cases do 
not stand for the proposition that the State must show that 
the appellant is connected with the criminal conduct as part. 
of the corpus delicti. Instead, appellant's cases require the 
State to show appellant is connected with the criminal conduct 
to sustain a conviction. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Bennett, supra, stated 
in the homicide of a newborn child that the elements of corpus 
delicti, which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
are: (1) that the infant was born alive and (2) that death 
was caused by the criminal agency of the accused. The case 
does not control the present situation because Bennett did not 
involve statements made by the defendant. In addition, 
Bennett dealt with sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction, and not the required proof of corpus delicti 
before the statement of a defendant can be admitted into 
evidence. The Bennett case held that before there can be a 
conviction, all elements (including that defendant caused 
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the criminal act) must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Bennett case followed the general rule that to sustain a 
conviction, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
all elements of the crime: (1) the death of the child: (2) 
criminal agency ((1) and (2) are the elements of the corpus 
delicti required before admitting a defendant's statements]: 
and then (3) the fact that the defendant caused the death. 
This is consistent with the case· law in Utah of proof required 
to sustain a homicide conviction. 
The Wyoming case is correct in requiring that the 
corpus delicti be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, along with 
the defendant's connection to the crime, before a defendant 
can be convicted. Respondent's reading of Bennett is 
supported by the several cases cited by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court in Bennett. F.ach case deals with the proof required to 
find corpus delicti to sustain a homicide conviction. People 
v. Ryan, 138 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. 1956), and State v. Osmus, 276 
P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954) do not discuss corpus delicti required 
before a defendant's statements can be admitted into evidence. 
Father, in both cases, the contention was that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict, i.e., there was insufficient 
proof of corpus delicti for the conviction. 
Respondent can find no Wyoming cases which support 
appellant's contention and apparently the Wyoming Supreme 
Court has not confronted the issue of the elements of corpus 
delicti required before an appellant's statements can be 
admitted into evidence. Even if there were Wyoming cases 
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on this point, they would not control this Court hecause of 
the numerous Utah cases, supra, dealing with this contention, 
all of which state that appellant need not be connected with 
the criminal agency before appellant's statements can be 
admitted into evidence. 
Appellant cites State v. Bassett, 27 Utah ?.d 272, 
495 P.2d 318 (19~2), claiming that the State cannot convict 
appellant for gross negligence or lack of care of Rrandon. In 
that case, this Court said a conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter could not be upheld where there was no evidence 
to show any criminal act by the defendants, the parents of the 
child who had died. In Bassett, there was no evidence of the 
second element of corpus delicti: death caused by someone's 
criminal conduct. There was no evidence of whether the 
child's head injuries were caused accidentally or if they were 
inflicted otherwise. An unfortunate death from injuries by a 
source not shown in the evidence was simply insufficient to 
support the conviction. For the same reasons, People v. 
Strohm, 523 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1974) is distinguishable from the 
present case. 
The Rassett and Strohm cases are not on point. In 
the case at bar, there was extensive evidence of the second 
requirement of corpus delicti, as discussed supra. Four 
physicians testified about the unsuccessful treatment of 
Brandon's injuries and the criminal nature of the injuries. 
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There was testimony that Brandon was suspected to be a victim 
of child abuse. Brandon was taken from appellant's custody 
and placed in a foster home, where he developed normally. 
There was evidence that Brandon's injuries were not caused 
accidentally. While there was no evidence of criminal agency 
in Bassett, there was clear and convincing evidence of 
criminal agency in the present case before appellant's 
statements were admitted into evidence. 
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (194~) 
is also not on point. Thatcher dealt with an involuntary 
manslaughter case in which the defendant was attempting to 
flee from highway patrol officers when defendant's car drove 
into a group of pedestrians, killing two people. Thatcher 
adds nothing to an understanding of the issues in the case at 
bar. 
Appellant cites State v. Gallegos, 16 tTtah 2d 102, 
396 P.2d 414 (19fi4) for the proposition that the State must 
prove an intent to kill or do great bodily harm, or do an act 
knowing the natural and probable consequence thereof will be 
death or great bodily harm. This case is of questionable 
validity because the conviction was based on Utah Code Ann., 
s 76-30-5 (1953), a statute now repealed, which provided for 
differing definitions (voluntary and involuntary manslaughter) 
of that form of homicide. The present manslaughter statute 
establishes one form of manslaughter, with three separate 
theories which will support a conviction. Utah Code Ann., 
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S 76-!)-205 ( 1953), as amended. Under the present statute, the 
State is not required to prove that appellant knew the natural 
or probable consequences of her act would be death. 
Respondent submits that independent proof of the 
corpus delicti of the manslaughter of Brandon Talbot was shown 
by clear and convincing evidence before appellant's statements 
were admitted into evidence. E\7.idence that accident could not 
be ruled out as the cause of the injuries does not destroy the 
elements of corpus delicti. 
C. THE F.:VIDRNCE WAS SUFFICIEN'I' ~O SUPPORT 
TBE JURY'S nETP.RMINATION THAT 
APPELLANT WAS GUILTY O:P MANSLAUGHTER. 
Appellant's arguments on the insufficiency of the 
evidence to prove corpus delicti necessarily incluoe the 
contention that there is insufficient evidence to convict 
appellant of manslaughter. Specifically, the claim of 
accidental injury to Brandon is an argument that the State did 
not provide sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of 
appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is 
well established that it must appear that reasonable minds 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that appellant 
committed the crime. State v. Wilson, Utah, 56~ P.2d 66 
(1977). Unless evidence compels a conclusion that as a matter 
of law evidence was inconclusive or so unsatisfactory that 
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reasonable minds acting fairly must have enterta inen 
reasonable doubt that appellant did not commit the crime, the 
verdict must be sustained. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 
1161 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 :s?.2d 229 (1980); State 
v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979); State v. naniels, Utah, 
584 P.2d A80 (lq7R); State v. Romero, TJtah, 554 J?.2d 21'5 
(1976). 
The evidence need not refute contrary allegations 
made by appellant if the verdict is supported by substantial 
evidence. State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d ?.29 (lqsn). The 
evidence, and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom, is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
fact finder's verdict. State v. r.,orlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 
(197q). A trial court's judgment has a presumption of 
validity in an appellate court. Burton v. Zions Cooperative 
Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 259 P.2d 514 (1952). It 
is the exclusive function of the trier of fact and not within 
the prerogative of a reviewing court to substitute its 
judgment for that of fact finder to determine guilt or 
innocence or to substitute its judgment on the weight to give 
conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses. State 
v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 21~ (1976). 
The appellate court may not review the sufficiency 
of the evidence in cases, like this one, where the fabric of 
ev ide nee against the appellant cove rs the gap be tween the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In the 
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present case, the evidence, stretched to its utMost limits, is 
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State in Re '-l.S.H., Utah, 114.2 P.2d 386 (1982) 1 State 
v. Kourbela s, TJtah, 621 P. 2d 12 3R ( 19 80). 
The standard of review was recently stated in State 
v • Mc Ca rd e 11 , Utah , P.2d (Case No. 17718, filed 
August ?.i, 1~82): 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man would not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. "Thus, 
intent to commit [a crime] ••• may be 
found from proof of facts from which it 
reasonably could be believed that such was 
defendant's intent." [Citations omitted.] 
Accordingly, when the evidence in this case is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient 
evidence to support the guilty verdict. 
F.vidence presented by the State established that 
Brandon Talbot was taken by appellant to the Utah valley 
Hospital at about 1:00 or 1:30 p.rn. on July 11, 1981 (T. 13, 
27, 47, 91, 112). Brandon had previously been placed in a 
foster home (T. 97, 1001 State's Exhibit~), hut on July 11, 
19Rl, Brandon was in appellant's sole custody during the time 
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the injuries were sustained (T. 16, 52, 91, 107, 1127 State's 
Exhibit 9). Brandon was initially treated for suffocation ann 
breathing difficulties (T. 17, 27). Efforts to restore 
Brandon's breathing were ineffective (T. lQ, 2~, 52). Because 
of normal acidic content in Rrandon • s blood (T. 18, 28, 14), 
because of multiple head injuries (T. 19, 35, 3q, 4R, 51, ~3), 
and because the explanation given by appellant was 
inconsistent with the severity of Brandon's injuries (T. 24, 
39, 53), criminal conduct by the appellant was suspected. 
There was also evidence of "Battered Child Syndrome" (T. 59, 
83) • 
A state medical examiner performen an autopsy and 
concluded that the injuries were caused by a solid object 
striking Brandon's head or by Brandon's head being banged 
against a solid object (T. 76). The medical examiner 
conclusively ruled out accident as an explanation of the 
injuries (T. 81) because there were multiple injuries, because 
of the different ages of the injuries (T. 81, 83), and because 
the most severe injury, which deceptively appeared only as a 
superficial bruise on the exterior of Brandon's head (T. 75), 
was actually a large swelling of the brain which, in 
combination with a bilateral subdural hematorna (T. 7~, 78), 
resulted in Brandon's death (T. ?.l, 40, 62, 75). 
There was also evidence of "Battered Child 
Syndrome," which is evidence that the injuries were not 
sustained accidentally. State v. Loss, 204 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 
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19~~)1 State v. Periman, 230 S.B.2d 802 (N.r.. Ct. App. 1977)1 
United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 19Al). It has 
become an accepted medical and legally qualifed diagnosis. 
People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d ~04, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
nr. Andrews suspected "Battered Child Syndrome" (T. 
59-60) because of the bruises on the head (T. 56), bruises on 
the child's back (T. 56), several scattered bruises on the 
buttocks ana penis (T. 56-57), and because of the 
discrepancies between the medical examination of Brandon and 
the explanation of the injuries by appellant (~. 59-60). Dr. 
Graham said Brandon's injuries were consistent with "Battered 
Child Syndrome" because there were bruises on various parts of 
Brandon's body, there were injuries of various ages, and the 
injuries were not expla inea. adequately and consistently with 
those caused by accidents (T. 83). 
In addition, there was evidence from a police 
officer who talked to appellant the day after Brandon died (T. 
84). Re read the Miranda rights to appellant and she signed a 
waiver form (T. 84-85). After the officer had an account of 
the conversation typed, appellant signed this statement after 
she had the opportunity to make changes (T. 85, 94). '!'his 
evidence corroborates the testimony of the four doctors. 
During tQe conversation, appellant said she was having 
marriage problems, financial problems and was constantly with 
her two children without having a chance to get out of the 
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house (T. 92: State's Exhibit 9). She said she needed to talk 
to someone but had had a difficult time in finding friends (T. 
921 State's Exhibit 9). Because of her frustration and 
anxiety toward Brandon, she had been hitting Rrandon during 
the three weeks prior to the day Brandon received the fatal 
i~juries (T. 92). Appellant said no one had hit the child 
other than herself (T. 95, 121, 122). 
On July 11, 1981, appellant had given Brandon a 
piece of toast around 1:30 p.m., but he had a temper tantrum 
(T. 92). Appellant slapped Brandon twice on the head and the 
secono hit resulted in Brandon's head hitting the edge of the 
table (T. 92). After she went to adjust the television, she 
heard Brandon choking as he fell out of the chair (T. 92). 
This testimony is also corroborated by appellant's 
testimony at trial. She said she was having marriage problems 
(T. 112), financial problems (T. 114), and having problems 
with Brandon (T. 11~). She argued with her husband over the 
amount of force she used in disciplining Brandon (T. 115). 
She said that her husband had beaten Brandon on occa-sion (T. 
112), but she added that her husband told her to limit her 
discipline and not to hit Brandon so hard (T. 116). 
Appellant slapped Brandon on July 11, 1981 and "his 
head hit pretty hard on the table" (T. 112). Brandon then 
fell out of the chair while she went to the television (T. 
112). She told Officer Pierpont that she hit Brandon harder 
than she intended to hit him (T. llR). She was alarmed that 
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Brandon's head hit the table so hard (T. 118). She said the 
bruise over Brandon's left temple area was caused "after I 
slapped him he lost his balance and hit his head on this side 
of the table" (T. 119). She said she slapped Brandon because 
she was mad (T. 120). 
From all of the evidence pesented, the jury fairly 
and reasonably could conclude that appellant recklessly caused 
the death of Brandon Talbot. This Court should not disturb 
that finding. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS WF.RE PROPERLY 
ADMI~TEn INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE APPELT.ANT 
WAIVED HBR MIRANDA RIGHTS AND BECAUSE SHE 
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CHANf;ES IN THE 
WRITTBN STA~EMENT BEFORE SIGNING IT. 
Appellant complains that her statements were 
improperly admitted into evidence because the State had not 
independently established the corpus delicti of manslaughter. 
Appellant contends that no corpus delicti had been proven 
because the injuries could have been caused accidentally and 
contends that the appellant's statements were improperly 
admitted to prove corpus delicti. Appellant also argues that 
even with the statements, there is not sufficient evinence to 
prove criminal agency (appellant's brief, 12-13). 
Appellant's Point II is similar to her first 
contention. Appellant claims that the State proved corpus 
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delicti of manslaughter only because appellant's statements 
were admitted into evidence. However, as discussed in Point 
I, supra, the evidence of corpus delicti even without 
appellant's confession and admissions was sufficient. 
neorge Pierpont, a Provo City police officer, talked 
to physicians at Utah Valley Hospital about Brandon's death 
(T. ~5, 83). He then went to appellant's residence and later 
interviewed appellant and her husband at the Provo City Police 
Department (T. 84). He advised appellant of her Miranda 
rights (T. 84-85)1 appellant said she understood the rights 
(T. 85) 1 appellant read the document, State's Exhibit 18 (T. 
85): and she signed the waiver form in the officer's presence 
(T. 85). Appellant and Pierpont cooperated in making a 
tape-recorded account of the conversation (T. 94). As 
Pierpont recorded the conversation, appellant had the 
opportunity to review the account as it was recorded to make 
any corrections (T. 94). After the statement was typed, 
appellant again had the opportunity to make changes (T. 94). 
Appellant then signed each of the three pages of the statement 
(T. 94: State's Bxhibit Q). 
Under these circumstances, appellant does not 
challenge the voluntariness of her statements to Officer 
Pierpont or clairn that the statements were the product of 
coercion by the police officer. Appellant's confession2 
2A confession admits the commission of a crime1 
that is, admits all the elements of the crime including guilty 
participation. An admission, on the other hand, admits only 
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could not be argued to be either. Respondent submits that 
appellant's confessions can be admitted into evidence when the 
confession is independently corroborated at some point in the 
trial. 
In Utah, an admission or a confession, without some 
independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, 
cannot alone support a guilty verdict. State v. Knoefler, 
Utah, 563 P.2d 175 (1977)1 State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554 
(1974); State v. Jessup, 98 Utah 482, 100 P.2d 969 (1970). 
on the other hand, when the corpus delicti has been 
established by independent evidence at trial, the confession 
of appellant can be used to connect appellant to the crime. 
State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554 (1974); State v. Erwin, 
101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1942); State v. Jessup, 98 Utah 
482, 100 P.?.d 969 (197n); State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 
some part or elements of the crime, but not the guilt, and 
leaves the rest, including participation, to be proved by 
other evidence. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010 
(193~). Appellant sa1a to the police officer: 
"I remember hitting him on the head on at 
least two occasions and on the second 
occasion he then struck his head on the 
edge of the kitchen tab le and started to 
er y. I was alarmed at that time be ca use 
he struck his head so hard on the kitchen 
table." 
(State's Exhibit 9; T. 93). This is a confession and is 
corroborated by appellant's direct testimony (T. 112) and 
testimony on cross-examination (T. 118). These statements 
confess to the manslaughter, recklessly causing the death of 
Brandon Talbot. 
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314 P.2d J!13 (1957). In State v. Knoefler, ntah, c;f;3 P.2d 1'5 
(1977), the defendant was convicted of drivinq under the 
influence of intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury on 
another. The evidence showed that defendant and two other 
persons were injured when the car in which they were riding 
overturned. Beer was found near the wreckage and defendant 
was staggering, was slurring his· speech and smelled of 
alcohol. At the scene, defendant admitted he was the driver 
of the car. The Court said: 
An admission or confession is admissible 
to connect an accused with the crime 
committed, but the connection of the 
accused with the crime need not be proven 
to establish the corpus delicti. The 
defendant's conviction is not subject to 
reversal since his admission was 
corrohora tea by independent evidence that 
a crime had occurred. The effect of the 
defendant's admission was to connect him 
to the crime, and his admission was not 
needed to es tab li sh that a crime had been 
committed. 
5 63 P. ?.d at 17 6. 
In the present case, appellant's confession was not 
neened to establish corpus delicti. The testimony of corpus 
delicti was admitted before appellant's confession and thus 
the confession was properly admitted into evidence. When the 
confession was properly admitted, it connected appellant to 
the crime and supported the conviction. 
-39-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ACTED PROP~RLY BY DENVINr, 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
Appellant alleges prejudicial error in the 
prosecutor's presentation of opening arguments to the jury. 
She claims that the words "death blow" were highly 
inflammatory, and unduly and unfairly prejudicea the jury. 
During the prosecutor's opening statement to the 
jury, he said: 
The tragedy of the case lies, not only in 
the fact that the child was so young, but 
that the death blow was delivered by the 
child's mother, the defendant in this 
particular case. 
(T. 7). nefense counsel objected and an off-the-record 
discussion was held by the trial judge with the prosecutor and 
the defense counsel. The prosecutor then continued with his 
opening statement: 
Now the evidence will be as follows: That 
the defendant struck her little child in 
the head~ that the death blow was struck 
on July 11, 1981, the second Saturday of 
July. 
(T. 7). Defense counsel did not object to the use of the 
words "death blow" at this point. Later, defense counsel made 
a motion for a mistrial based upon the opening argument of the 
prosecutor (T. 9-10). The trial judge denied the motion (T. 
11). 
-40-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant also claims that the prosecution used the 
words "death blow" and "words of that kind" during the course 
of the trial. Appellant does not refer to any part of the 
record other than the sections relating to the prosecutor.• s 
opening statement to support this claim. Defense counsel 
renewed the motion for a mistrial after the State had rested 
(T. 102) and also made a motion-· to dismiss the information 
because: 
The evidence adduced at trial is evi~ence 
of intentional acts of the defendant and 
that tends to prove another crime, Your 
Honor, which is the crime of murder in the 
second degree. • • • There is no evidence 
of manslaughter. There is no evidence of 
recklessly causing the death of the child. 
(T. 103). The motions were denied (T. 104). 
Appellant's contentions are without merit because: 
(1) the opening arguments by the prosecutor were accurate 
comments upon the evidence later presented at trial; (2) the 
opening arguments were not prejudicial and inflammatory but 
accurate descriptions of what happened to Brandon Talbot; and 
(3) the jury was instructed that statements by counsel are not 
evidence and must be given no significance where the 
statements have no basis in the evidence (R. 35). 
A review of the prosecutor's opening arguments 
reveals that he was simply commenting upon the evidence he 
would present at trial. Respondent agrees with appellant 
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that the prosecution cannot use improper methods of securing a 
conviction and that the prosecutor cannot preaicate his 
opening arguments on his knowledge, as was held in People v. 
Purvis, 384 P.2d 424 (Cal. 1963), cited in appellant's brief. 
People v. Lyons, 303 P.2d 329 (Cal. l95fi) is also not 
applicable to the present facts because there the district 
-
attorney improperly referred to _
7 
__ .a prior conviction of 
defendant on cross-examination before the defendant had 
testified in his own behalf. 
An opening statement in a criminal case is an 
outline of facts which the prosecution in good faith expects 
to prove. People v. Roberts, 4 26 N. E. 2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1981). An opening statement merely provides an opportunity 
for counsel to advise the jury of the facts and questions 
before them. State v. Simpson, 641 P.2d 32n (Hawaii l~R2); 
People v. Ramos, 639 P.2d 90R (Cal. 1982). Where an opening 
argument closely follows the evidence introduced later, there 
can be no error. State v. Wilson, 62~ P.2d 998 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
The purpose of an opening argument is to advise the 
jury of the facts relied upon and of the questions and issues, 
and to give the jury a general picture of the facts so that 
they will be able to understand the evidence. State v. Erwin, 
101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). Generally, counsel should 
be al lowea considerable la ti tu de and make a fair statement of 
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the evidence. In Erwin, the Court sa ia: 
• • • and the extent to which he may go is 
largely in the discretion of the trial 
court. He should not make a statement of 
any facts which he cannot legally prove 
upon the trial~ nor should he argue the 
merits of his case, or relate the 
testimony at length. 
Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313. The prosecutor in his opening 
arguments must refrain from stating facts (such as defendant's 
criminal record) which he will not be permitted to prove 
during the presentation of the State's case in chief. Garner 
v. State, 374 P.2d 525 (Nev. 1C)62). 
In State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 
(1973), the Court examined the closing arguments of the 
prosecutor to the jury and held that there was no error where 
the final argument was within the range of reasonable 
inferences which could be drawn from the evidence. The Valdez 
Court's explanation of closing arguments seems appropriate for 
opening arguments as well: 
The test of whether the reMarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. The 
determination of whether the improper 
remarks have influenced a verdict is 
within the sound discretion of the trial 
court on motion for a new trial. If there 
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be no abuse of this oiscretion ana 
substantial justice appears to have been 
done, the appellate court will not reverse 
the judgment. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. 
Under the Valdez test, the prosecutor did not call 
to the attention of the jurors in the instant case matters 
which they would not be justified in considering to oetermine 
the appellant's guilt. Three elements of manslaughter in this 
case were: (1) the death of Brandon Talbot, (2) caused by 
blows to his head, (3) which were delivered by appellant. The 
prosecutor in his opening argument made a common sense 
observation of the facts which he later did in fact enter into 
evidence. It was a common sense observation that the jurors 
could consider: blows to Rrandon's head nelivered by 
appellant caused his death. The prosecutor outlined these 
elements for the jury and told the jury that he would present 
evinence on these elements at the trial (T. 7). 
The prosecutor did not say or insinuate that the 
opening argument was based on his personal knowledge_ or on 
anything other than the testimony which was presented shortly 
after, during the trial. The prosecutor did not indicate his 
personal opinion of appellant's guilt. In his outline of the 
case, it is difficult to imagine how the prosecutor could 
explain his evidence without talking about (1) death (2) blows 
to Brandon's head or (3) appellant as the criminal actor. In 
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homicide cases, the prosecution has always heen allowed in 
opening arguments to talk about death, how it was caused and 
that the defendant allegedly did the act. There was nothi.ng 
improper with the opening arguments of the prosecutor, and all 
of his arguments were based on legally admissible evidence, 
which was in fact presented to the jury. 
Moreover, the determination whether improper 
remarks, if any, of the prosecutor during opening arguments to 
the jury have influenced a verdict lies within the discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 
P.2d 530 (1973). Also, note 6, State v. Vigil, Utah, 
P.2d (Case No. 1Rll8, filed March 18, lq83). If there is 
no abuse -of discretion and substantial justice appears to have 
been done, the appellate court will not reverse the judgment. 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973). 
Appellant has not shown that she was prejudiced by 
the prosecutor's words "death blow," which accurately describe 
the injuries to Brandon Talhot. A simple finding of guilt 
without appellant showing prejudice in the jury's reaching its 
verdict is not, by itself, grounds for reversal. Appellant 
has not shown that the words have improperly influenced the 
jurors' minds as to the guilt of appellant. There is no 
showing that the words "death blow" were the sole basis for 
the guilty verdict or that the jury would have decided 
otherwise if the words had not been used. The prosecutor 
should be allowed to use words in his opening argument which 
the jurors will use later in their deliberations. 
( 
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There was no pr ej ud ice to appellant which would 
support grounds for reversal. The opening arguments were 
supported by the evidence. The evidence was clear and 
decisive, and the trial court's judgment should be upheld, 
notwithstanding any alleged misconduct by the prosecutor (two 
references to "death blow") or the trial judge (denying a 
motion to dismiss). Respondent submits that there was no 
error by the prosecutor or the trial judge, hut if there was 
an error, this Court should find that it was harmless in the 
context of the evidence, which was sufficient to sustain a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Patter son, Utah, (Case No. 17610, filed 
November 5, 19 82) • 
Furthermore, the trial judge instructed the jurors 
that statements by the prosecutor or the defense counsel were 
not evidence. Instruction Number 3 said, in part: 
Statements, arguments, and remarks of 
counsel are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and in applying 
the law, but they are not evidence. You 
should disregard any such utterance that 
has no basis in the evidence. 
(R. 35). The jurors were expressly told to reject arguments 
of counsel, unless the arguments were supported by the 
evidence. The trial judge instructed the jurors that they 
should not consider the opening argument as evidence. 
Additionally, the trial judge instructed them to disregard the 
arguments which were incompetent, i.e., not supported by the 
evidence. 
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Respondent urges that any alleged prejudicial error 
did not result from the prosecutor's opening argument where 
the jury was given a cautionary instruction and the evidence 
supported, directly and by inference, the appellant's 
conviction for the manslaughter of Brandon Talbot, who (1) 
died (2) from blows to the head (3) which were delivered by 
appellant. All elements outlined in the prosecutor's opening 
argument were properly placed in evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosectuion presented sufficient evidence on the 
two requirements of corpus delicti: (1) death of a human 
being and (2) that the death resulted from criminal conduct. 
When the corpus delicti was established by independent proof, 
the confession of appellant was properly admitted into 
evidence to connect appellant with the crime. There was also 
sufficient evidence to sustain the manslaughter conviction and 
to sustain the court's finding that appellant was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant's confession was properly admitted into 
evidence because she waived her Miranda rights and because she 
had an opportunity to make changes in the written statement 
before signing it. 
The prosecutor's use of the words "death blow" in 
his opening argument was not prejudicial, but was an accurate 
description of the properly admitted evidence. 
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Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the 
conviction and sentence of appellant be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ..S-~ay of April, 
1983. 
~~ __ r P EN MIKITA 
ssistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to ~ary H. 
Weight, Attorney for Appellant, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & 
Esplin, 4 3 East 200 North, Provo, Utah, 846 03, th is S day 
of April, 1983. 
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